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AUTHOR(S):

大伴, 慎吾

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“Object” and Color Exclusion Problem in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*

Shingo OTOMO

Is it true that the “objects” of the *Tractatus* are phenomena, direct experience, or sense-data? I think it is, like some interpreters, however, we have some problems to solve. The most serious one is the so-called “Color Exclusion Problem”. This problem is that as long as objects are sense-data, the independency of elementary propositions seems to conflict the incompatibility of colors.

Some interpreters such as Mr. and Mrs. Hintikka, two of the most famous interpreters of Wittgenstein, have tried to solve this problem by avoiding this conflict. Their solution is deliberate, but I argue that it fails.

Unlike them, I believe that the Color Exclusion Problem was not a problem for Wittgenstein to solve, when he wrote the *Tractatus*, because he was confused about his own idea of the “contradiction”. So, the Color Exclusion Problem does not threaten our interpretation of the objects as sense-data, though it does threaten the *Tractatus*. This is what made Wittgenstein change his mind after he wrote the book.